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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the choice of the degree of flexibility allowed to the exchange
rate. Recent work by Calvo and Reinhart [9], Reinhart [31], Reinhart and Rogoﬀ
[32], Fischer [14] and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger [25] have concluded that
many of the de jure free floaters strongly intervene to soften the fluctuations
of the nominal exchange rate. This has been labeled as fear of floating. They
also observed that the degree of intervention in the exchange market varies
across countries so that diﬀerent degrees of flexibility are allowed for diﬀerent
currencies.
We construct a target zone model to analyze the choice of exchange rate
flexibility. We believe the target zone approach is useful for several reasons.
First, many currencies in fact fluctuate or have fluctuated in an explicit target
zone. This is the case of historical episodes like the EMS. It is also the case of the
current ERM2. This system is working as a “hub-and-spokes” zone between the
euro and those currencies of the European Union countries not participating in
the Monetary Union (United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden). Also, accession
countries to the European Union have to commit to a target zone arrangement
during the transition period. As we explain below, our paper contributes to this
literature on explicit target zones.
Second, the choice of exchange rate flexibility can be viewed under a target
zone perspective. In our view, such a flexibility can be approximated by the
bandwidth where the exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate. Broad classes of
exchange rate regimes can then be seen as special cases of this bandwidth.
For instance, a pegged rate can be interpreted as a band of fluctuation with
a zero width and a pure floating rate is equivalent to an infinite fluctuation
band. This is, of course, a very crude simplification of the diﬀerent exchange
rate regimes. For example, it does not distinguish between diﬀerent forms of
hard pegs. However, it should be clear that we will not try to map every single
exchange rate regime into a corresponding target zone. Instead, what we do
is to construct a general model that summarizes the degree of exchange rate
flexibility in a single parameter, i.e. the bandwidth. To the extent that broad
classes of regimes diﬀer in the degree of variability allowed to the exchange rate,
we believe this simplification to be useful for the analysis and comparison of
these broad classes of exchange systems. In this sense, it is important to notice
that we use the term target zone in a broad sense to refer to any system that
limits the movements of the exchange rate within a band of fluctuation either
explicitly or implicitly.
As mentioned before, the fear of floating literature has pointed out that coun-
tries reveal a preference towards smoothing the dynamics of the exchange rate.
Intermediate regimes seem to be defining the current world so that completely
fixed or fully flexible rates (see Fischer [14]) are seldom observed. Pure fixed
exchange rate regimes are rarely used since they compromise a large amount
of monetary independence. A monetary commitment that pegs the exchange
rate to a low inflation foreign currency can establish a disciplining eﬀect that
motivates a higher degree of credibility and price stability (see Giavazzi and
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Pagano [19]). However, given the evidence on the choice of currency regimes
by central banks, it seems that the gains from stability of fixed exchange rates
have not been big enough to dampen the losses from less monetary indepen-
dence (see Svensson [39] for a detailed discussion). On the other hand, pure free
floating regimes are not observed either. Monetary authorities use to play lean-
ing against the wind policies in an attempt to control the exchange rate around
some target level, oﬃcial or unoﬃcially. Thus, it seems that hybrid regimes
that limit exchange rate fluctuations have been widely used on the basis that it
apparently reaps the benefits of both flexible and fixed exchange rates.
Krugman [23] presented the model that has become the standard tool to
study target zone regimes. The dynamics of the exchange rate were derived
from a linear asset pricing relation and an arbitrage condition given by the un-
covered interest rate parity. His model assumed that the central bank intervenes
so as to maintain the exchange rate within the band. In this paper, we extend
Krugman’s model in two directions: (i) we allow the central bank to perform
intramarginal interventions, that is, to use its monetary policy to aﬀect the
exchange rate before it hits the limits of the band and, (ii) we introduce lack
of credibility of the target zone, that is, the perception by market participants
of the possibility that the central bank will not defend the band when it has
to. Several authors (see Bertola and Caballero [6] and Bertola and Svensson
[7]) have previously proposed the introduction of both extensions to improve
the empirical fit of target zone models. However, to the best of our knowledge
no such experiment has been conducted so far. We show that both features
are suﬃcient to reconcile the model with data.1 As a second issue, we use the
model to rationalize the choice of the degree of flexibility of the exchange rate.
It is shown that, by imposing a band of fluctuation for the exchange rate, either
explicitly or implicitly, the monetary authority may gain eﬃciency through re-
ducing volatility of both the exchange rate and the interest rate simultaneously.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the general model.
Subsections 2.2 to 2.4 show how diﬀerent exchange rate regimes can be seen as
extreme cases of a target zone. Section 2.5 develops the target zone solution.
Section 3 deals with the two questions outlined in the previous paragraph. The
last section concludes.
2 Set up of the Model
2.1 General assumptions
The model represents a highly stylized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
economy. It can be thought of as a reduced form version of more complicated
fully optimizing models. Time is discrete. First, consider an equation specifying
1Models with perfectly credible target zones have introduced intramarginal interventions
by allowing some degree of mean reversion in the stochastic motion governing fundamentals
(see Froot and Obstfeld [18] as well as Lindberg and Söderlind [28]). Mean reversion is then
associated with leaning against the wind exchange practices. Bertola and Caballero [6] intro-
duce the assumption of imperfect credibility but do not consider intramarginal interventions.
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equilibrium in the money market:
mt − pt = ϕyt − γit + ξt, (1)
where mt is money supply, pt is the domestic price level of yt, a tradable good,
it is the domestic interest rate of a one-period bond, and ξt is some shock to
money demand. These variables are all expressed in logs, with the exception of
the interest rate. The parameters ϕ and γ are both positive: money demand
increases with output because of a transaction motive and there is an implicit
liquidity preference behavior, meaning that money can be a substitute for a
bond that returns a nominal interest it.
Let xt be the log of the nominal exchange rate, expressing the price of one
unit of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency. The (log) real exchange
rate is given by
qt = xt − pt + p∗t , (2)
where p∗t is the foreign price (variables with star will denote the foreign ana-
logue).
Call dt ≡ it − i∗, the interest rate diﬀerential, where i∗ is the foreign (con-
stant) rate, and assume perfect capital mobility, risk aversion and the uncovered
interest rate parity condition (UIP)
dt = Et {xt+1 − xt}+ rt, (3)
where Et is the expectation operator conditional on the information available
at time t. Thus, the expected rate of depreciation must compensate for the
interest rate diﬀerential plus the foreign premium, rt. We assume the variable
rt to be exogenous and governed by a first order Markov process
rt = rt−1 + εt. (4)
The white noise {εt} is supposed to be Gaussian, εt ∼ N
¡
0, σ2
¢
, for conve-
nience.2
Using (2), (3) and (1) one obtains
xt = ft + γEt {xt+1 − xt} , (5)
ft = mt + vt,
vt = θt + γrt,
θt = qt − p∗t − ϕyt + γi∗ − ξt.
2The foreign risk premium plays a key role in the current paper. In general, the UIP does
not hold (see Ayuso and Restoy [2]). Conventional target zone models consider that deviations
from UIP are negligible in target zones (see Svensson [37]). However, Bekaert and Gray [5]
find that the risk premia in a target zone are sizable and should not be ignored. They argue
that this might be the reason of why the credibility tests run on EMS at the beginning of
the nineties failed to anticipate the 1992-93 turbulences. Alvarez, et al. [1] show from data
on interest rates and exchange rates that variations in the interest rate diﬀerential are driven
almost entirely by variations in the risk premium.
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Thus, the exchange rate, as the price of any asset, depends linearly on funda-
mental variables aﬀecting its value, ft and on its own expected rate of change.
The fundamental determinants of the exchange rate, ft, amount to the policy
variable, mt, plus an exogenous process, vt, which include variables like domes-
tic output, prices, the risk premium, etc. Controlling the money supply, the
central bank has control over total fundamentals and, therefore, the exchange
rate. By iterating forward on xt we have that
xt = (1− ν)
∞X
τ=0
ντEtft+τ = (1− ν)
∞X
τ=0
ντEt {mt+τ + vt+τ} , (6)
with ν ≡ γ (1 + γ)−1. The forward looking behavior from UIP implies that
the value of asset xt is the present discounted value of the future stream of
fundamentals. Notice that (1− ν)
P∞
τ=0 ν
τ = 1, thus, if mt+τ were orthogonal
to vt+τ for all t and τ , the long run eﬀect of an increase in mt is to impulse xt
by an equal amount. We assume that both the central bank and traders can
observe the realization of θt and rt.
The central bank (henceforth, CB) preferences are modeled to evaluate the
trade-oﬀ between interest rate variability versus exchange rate variability
J =
1
2
Et
( ∞X
τ=0
βτ
h
d2t+τ + λ (xt+τ − ct)
2
i)
. (7)
This objective function is intended to induce the fear of floating behavior de-
scribed in the Introduction. The intuition is as follows. We think of a very
short maturity term for the bond in the UIP, say a few days, a week or a month
at most. The idea is that the CB controls some monetary aggregate {mt} to
target the pair {dt, xt}. Output realizations and real fluctuations are observed
with some delay, and not available by the time monetary policy is decided so
the only available information at any period is {θt, rt}. From (3) and (5) it is
easy to show that mt will respond one to one to the shock θt and the problem
reduces to deciding how to split the shock rt between dt and xt. Thus, the CB
just needs to choose dt and xt every period given the value of rt to minimize (7)
subject to (3), (4) and the exchange regime which restricts the policies available
to the CB. Because of the nature of the problem, the central bank will smooth
fluctuations in the exchange rate by channeling part of the variation in the risk
premium to interest rates. Thus, the parameter λ in the function (7) will reflect
how much the central bank fears the fluctuations in the exchange rate.3
In what follows, any of the exchange rate regimes can be characterized by
the triple {λ,w, α}. The first element is related to the preferences. The number
w is the band width. The last term α is the probability that the CB defends the
currency when it is outside the band and measures the credibility of the exchange
3Alvarez, Atkenson and Kehoe [1] show that time-varying risk premia is the primary force
driving the link between interest rate diﬀerentials and exchange rates. Because one of the
objectives of the paper is to reproduce the distribution of these two variables, we concentrate
on risk premia as the driving exogenous force in the model.
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regime. This triple will adopt particular values for any of the exchange regimes
considered.
Our model shares some features with Svensson’s [38]. For example, the
objective function (7) can be seen as a simplified version to the one used by
Svensson. However, Svensson does not impose the band restriction (i.e. the
width w in our context) and approximates the nominal exchange rate solution
with a linear function. On the contrary, we will show that the band restriction
is a source of non linearity that should not be neglected. In combination with
the degree of credibility and intramarginal interventions, the non linear solution
is relevant to analyze how smooth is the response of the exchange rate to the
fundamental at any point within the band. In addition, this width allows us to
approximate the degree of flexibility allowed to the exchange rate.
2.2 The fixed exchange rate
Consider first a CB that can credibly commit to fix the exchange rate to ct = c.
This regime represents the extreme situation in which no flexibility is allowed
to the exchange rate. It appears as a particular case of the target zone when
w = 0 and α = 1. Given the forward looking restriction of (3) and the pure
random walk exhibited by rt, the solution for dt and xt is
dt = rt and xt = c. (8)
That is, under a fixed exchange rate regime the nominal interest rate absorbs
the whole variability of rt. The expected value of the game under this regime is
Jc (rt) =
1
2
µ
1
1− β
¶·
r2t +
β
1− βσ
2
¸
. (9)
The variability of the interest rate is a source of time inconsistency. If the
CB could commit to a rule like (8), it should respond to the risk premium by
moving the interest rate in the same magnitude so as to maintain the exchange
rate at the central parity. However, there arises the possibility of deviating from
this simple rule in order to reduce interest rate variability. If this temptation
is captured by market participants, the simple rule will no longer be credible.
Hence, (8) would be time inconsistent.
2.3 The pure free float
Consider now the case where the CB announces that the risk premium shocks
will not be dampened over the exchange rate, whatever the preference parameter
λ is. That means
xt = c+ rt. (10)
This is a laissez faire solution. The slope of the exchange rate function with
respect to the fundamental is one. According to the UIP (3), the interest rate
diﬀerential is again given by
dt = xt − c = rt.
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As with the fixed rate, the CB is not deciding its monetary policy rule to
optimize (7) and this may be a source of time inconsistency. In general, the
market will perceive that CB’s incentives to trade volatility of the exchange
rate for volatility of the interest rate are diﬀerent than 1 and the announcement
of the free float will be no longer credible.
We can compute the indirect value function for the free float:
Jff (rt) =
1
2
µ
1 + λ
1− β
¶·
r2t +
βσ2
1− β
¸
. (11)
2.4 Intervention with an infinite band
This regime is a particular case of the target zone when {λ > 0, w →∞, α = 1}.
With this regime the CB intervenes to exploit the trade-oﬀ between the vari-
ability of the exchange rate and the interest rate every period. After the shock
rt is realized and agents have formed their expectations on future values for
the exchange rate, the CB must set the two target variables {dt+τ , xt+τ}∞τ=0
with one instrument {mt+τ}∞τ=0, to minimize the loss (7) subject to the arbi-
trage condition (3) and the relation in (4). Notice the exchange regime does not
impose additional restrictions. We analyze this system because it is a limiting
case of the target zone regime described next and because it has an analytical
solution that serves as a reference to compare with the target zone solution.
The optimality condition is given by the diﬀerence equation
xt = c+
rt
λ
+
1
λ
Et {xt+1 − xt} . (12)
The central parity is constant here since, with an infinitely-wide band, there
will be no realignments. From (4), a linear closed form solution of (12) is
xt = c+
rt
λ
. (13)
The discretionary rate is then equal to the fixed rate plus a depreciation bias.
Forming a one-period ahead expectation yields
Etxt+1 = c+
rt
λ
= xt, (14)
so, from (3), the target variable dt is
dt = rt. (15)
A shock to the risk premium impulses exchange and interest rates in the same
direction. Combining (13) and (15), a linear control condition is given by
dt = λ (xt − c) , (16)
meaning that the interest rate diﬀerential is proportional to the depreciation
(or appreciation) bias with respect to the central parity. This is just a leaning
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against the wind policy, where the interest rate diﬀerential is positive when the
currency is above the target and negative below. Under the uncovered interest
rate parity, conditional on xt, the risk premium has a positive relation with dt.
Similarly, conditional on dt, rt has also a positive relation with xt. Therefore, a
central bank that is concerned about the volatility of interest rate diﬀerentials
and of exchange rates will optimally split the variation of rt between dt and xt.
This results in a regime of intramarginal interventions or managed float. The
higher the value of the exchange rate weight in preferences, λ, the smaller the
variance for the exchange rate is.4
The explicit form for the expected value of the game under this regime is
calculated as
J∞ (rt) =
1 + λ
2λ
µ
1
1− β
¶·
r2t +
β
1− β σ
2
¸
. (17)
The relation between the values for the fixed rate, the free float and this regime
can be written as
Jff = λJ∞ = (1 + λ)Jc,
for any rt. Diﬀerences among regimes will have to be found in the exchange
rate dynamics since they imply the same process for the interest rate diﬀerential.
Clearly, the fixed rate is preferred over the two other regimes, although it is time
inconsistent. In the intervention regime with an infinite band, the attempt of the
CB in giving the interest rate a lower volatility by trading with the exchange rate
variance is a vain eﬀort. It results in a discretionary time consistent solution,
where the volatility of the interest rate is unaﬀected and the exchange rate
begins to float. The CB is worse oﬀ. The ordering of the losses for the free float
and the band with an infinite amplitude will depend upon the value of λ. If
λ < 1, the CB is better oﬀ with the free float. Otherwise, for λ ≥ 1, intervening
the exchange rate is a better regime.
2.5 The target zone
In this case, the regime is characterized by {λ ≥ 0, w ≥ 0, α ∈ [0, 1]}. The first
element is related to the preferences in (7). The number w is the band width.
The last term α is the probability that the CB defends the currency when it
is outside the band and measures the credibility of the exchange regime. Here
we assume that the band is imposed either explicitly or implicitly. Either way,
markets participants know of its existence. Furthermore, we suppose that the
CB defends the currency with probability 1 within the bands.
From the previous discussion, both the exchange rate and the interest rate
diﬀerential will be functions of the shock rt. So, the timing of events at any
time t will be as follows:
1. The shock rt is realized.
4Expression (16) can also be considered a nominal monetary conditions index (MCI). The
optimal policy is thus to move interest rates and exchange rates so as to leave the MCI constant
to movements in the risk premium. Appendix A includes an interpretation of the preferences
of the central bank along the lines of the MCI. For further information on MCI see Ball [3].
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2. If the realization of the shock makes the exchange rate be within the target
zone, the CB solves a minimization problem. The process is as follows:
• The central parity from last period is left unaltered: ct = ct−1.
• Forward looking agents form expectations Et(xt+1).
• For given {Et(xt+1), rt, ct}, the CB chooses {xt, dt} by minimizing
the loss (7) subject to the arbitrage condition (3), the relation in (4)
and the additional restriction imposed by the target zone system.
3. If for that value of the shock the exchange rate should be outside a band
[ct − w, ct + w], for instance, say it is above the upper limit ct + w, the
CB can do any of two actions:
• It defends the currency with probability α. This means that the
exchange rate is pegged at the edge of the band, xt = ct + w, and
the central parity is not altered, ct = ct−1.
• It realigns the currency with probability (1− α). In this case, the
central bank devalues the central parity by µ ≥ w, i.e. ct = ct−1+µ,
and situates the exchange rate at xt = ct.
4. Finally, for a given shock θt in the money demand equation (5), the CB
supplies the optimal quantity of money mt supporting the pair {xt, dt}.
To understand the way this economy works consider the following. Assume
the risk premium starts from r0 = 0. The CB can set the exchange rate at
x0 = 0 and a target zone of width w around c0 = 0. Because of the symmetry
of the forcing process, the interest rate diﬀerential is d0 = 0, which equals the
target value for that variable. As time progresses, the risk premium wanders
around and the exchange rate moves away from its center c0 = 0. Given that
the exchange rate is a function of the shock rt, the foreign risk premium must
also be fluctuating within a symmetric zone with center ρ0 = 0. This zone is
denoted as [ρ0 − r, ρ0 + r]. How far the exchange rate wanders from the center
of its band should be a function of the distance between the risk premium and
ρ0. So, for the periods before the first realignment, we could write
xt = c0 + u(rt − ρ0),
where u(rt − ρ0) is the function linking the exchange rate to the fundamental
process rt within the band.
Imagine that at time t = τ , one of the limits of the exchange rate band is
reached. This means that rτ = ρ0 ± r two level conditions must be satisfied
u (−r) = −w, (18)
and
u (r) = w. (19)
8
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When the exchange rate is at the boundaries of the target zone, the CB could
keep xt at the edge of its band. In such a case, all movements in rt will be
transferred to the interest rate diﬀerential. The other possibility implies the
central bank realigning the target zone. In such a case, the exchange rate jumps
to cτ = cτ−1 + µ, and the center of the band for the risk premium moves to
ρτ = rτ . After the realignment takes place, the behavior of the exchange rate
band within the target zone is again governed by the function u so we can write
in general
xt = ct + u(rt − ρt).
Let x(rt) be the function relating the exchange rate to the risk premium
at any time, that is, within as well as outside the target zone. This function
satisfies
x (rt) = ct



+µ if rt > ρt + r with probability 1− α
+w if rt > ρt + r with probability α
+u (rt − ρt) if rt ∈ [ρt − r, ρt + r]
−w if rt < ρt − r with probability α
−µ if rt < ρt − r with probability 1− α.
(20)
The unknown continuous function u (rt − ρt) represents the CB’s best response
when the risk premium lies within its band [ρt − r, ρt + r]. To find it, we use
the first order condition for values of rt ∈ [ρt − r, ρt + r],
(1 + λ)u (rt − ρt) + ct = rt +Et [x (rt+1)] . (21)
Outside of the band, condition (21) does no longer hold and the trade-oﬀ is
not optimal. We use numerical methods to approximate the function u (rt − ρt)
from conditions (21) and (20). Once the function u (rt − ρt) is computed, we
use (20) and (3) to find the exchange rate and the interest rate diﬀerential,
respectively.
3 Results
Before we start with the computations, let us first remind the reader about the
implications derived from the main features of Krugman’s model: the honey-
moon and the smooth pasting eﬀects (see Svensson [36] and Krugman and Miller
[24]). The first means that the response of the exchange rate to changes in fun-
damentals is smaller than the response under the free floating regime. That is,
as compared to a free floating, the band works as an exchange rate stabilizer.
The smooth pasting implies that the response of the exchange rate tends to
zero as it approaches the edges of the band. This is because agents are forward
looking and anticipate the intervention by the central bank when the exchange
rate gets close to the limit of the band.
Svensson [36] has summarized the testable implications of Krugman’s model.
First, the distributions of both the exchange rate and the interest rate are U -
shaped. That is, the exchange rate tends to live close to the limits of the band.
9
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Second, there is a negative and deterministic relation between the exchange rate
and the interest rate diﬀerential. This relation is given by the uncovered interest
rate parity. Finally, the exchange rate exhibits a non-linearity in its univariate
forecasting equation, which is a consequence of the smooth pasting eﬀect. How-
ever, empirical tests have challenged these predictions. The distribution of the
exchange rate has been observed to be hump-shaped rather than U -shaped,
so the exchange rate accumulates probability around the center of the band.
Secondly, the relationship between the exchange rate and the interest rate is
positive rather than negative. Finally, it seems that the eﬀects of the smooth
pasting condition are not as relevant as predicted by theory and exchange rates
are linear functions of the fundamentals.
It is easy to show that lack of credibility together with intramarginal in-
terventions contribute separately to reproduce these stylized facts. First, the
smooth-pasting condition is no longer valid without credibility which decreases
the probability of the exchange rate to be close to the edges of the band. Further-
more, intramarginal interventions smooth exchange rates which also contribute
to push the exchange rate towards the center of the band. Second, the lean-
ing against the wind policy derived from intramarginal interventions produces
a positive relation between the interest rate diﬀerential and the exchange rate
and makes the function linking the exchange rate to fundamentals closer to be
linear. However, these results are far from being guaranteed once the two ex-
tensions considered in this paper are included at the same time. On the one
hand, lack of credibility also reduces the honeymoon eﬀect (see Bertola and
Caballero [6]) which counteracts the exchange rate smoothing associated with
intramarginal interventions. On the other hand, realignment risks can make the
relation between the exchange rate and the interest rate diﬀerential being either
positive, negative or zero (see Bertola and Svensson [7]).
In what follows we calibrate our model and compare its predictions with
the data to evaluate whether the interaction of the two extensions considered
in this paper can reproduce the styled facts mentioned above. Furthermore, we
compute the losses (7) under diﬀerent regimes and provide a rationale as of why
limiting the fluctuations of the exchange rate has been widely used.
3.1 Parameters
There are 6 parameters in the model: the discount factor β, the standard devi-
ation of the risk premium, σ, the width of the band, w, the realignment rate,
µ, the probability of defense, α, and the weight of the exchange rate in the
preferences of the central bank, λ. We think of a week as the time frequency.
As in Svensson [38], the time discount factor is set to β = 0.90
1
52 . We use this
value to ease the calculations but the main results of the paper do not hinge on
it.
The selection of a standard deviation for the shock to the risk premium,
σ, is a troublesome task. Bekaert [4] reports an unconditional variance for a
time invariant risk premium of 10.6222, for the Dollar/Yen rate. This figure
yields a weekly standard deviation of about σ = 0.002 basis points per week.
10
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We also use the ARCH-in-mean estimation by Domowitz and Hakkio [13], for
monthly observations 1973:6-1982:8, of the British Pound, the French Franc,
the Deustche Mark, the Japanese Yen and the Swiss Franc, all against the US
Dollar. A Montecarlo simulation has been run in order to calculate this moment.
Table 1 reports the standard deviations for a first diﬀerence of rt. The Swiss
Franc presents a time invariant risk premium. Hence, it seems reasonable to
assume an a priori value σ = 0.002, as in Bekaert [4].
Two band widths are chosen, w = ±2.25% and ±6.00%, the ones experi-
enced in the ERM. The value of the constant µ is estimated depending on the
band width w. Tables 2 collects data of realignment rates for the currencies
participating in the ERM of the EMS, except for the Dutch Guilder. From this
table it seems that realignment rates of ±4.5% and ±6.3% for widths of ±2.25
and ±6%, respectively, are consistent with the EMS history
Since there is no prior for the relative weight of the exchange rate variability
in the preferences of the CB, we use a wide range of values within which the
parameter λ is thought to be about. These values are λ = 0.2, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0 and
5.0. We also compute results for diﬀerent values of α, the probability of defense.
3.2 Nonlinearities in the exchange rate function
Let us start examining the degree of nonlinearities in the exchange rate function
predicted by our model. Figures 1 to 3 plot the function u (rt) for probabilities
of defense α = 0, 0.5, and 1, together with the infinite band and the free float.
The three figures diﬀer on the value of λ which are 0.5, 1, and 2, respectively.
The 45 degree line corresponds to the free float and the other linear solution is
the infinite band with interventions. The relative slopes of these two solutions
depend on the value of λ. Among the nonlinear solutions, the flattest function
corresponds to α = 1, the target zone regime under perfect credibility. On
the other extreme, the most sloping curve corresponds to the case where the
currency is realigned for sure at margins, that is, α = 0.
According to our model, the degree of non linearity increases with (i) a
tightening of the fluctuation band, that is, a reduction in w, (ii) an increase
in the preferences for exchange rate smoothing, that is, an increase in λ, and
(iii) changes in credibility, that is, in the probability α. With respect to the
amplitude, if w is increased, the exchange regime naturally tends to some form
of floating. As sections 2.3 and 2.4 show floating regimes make the exchange
rate a linear function of fundamentals. Second, the stronger the preferences for
exchange rate smoothing, that is, the larger λ is, the more homogeneous the
response of the exchange rate is to fundamentals which increases the linearity
of the function u. Finally, if credibility is low, the exchange rate displays an
inverted S form as in Bertola and Caballero [6]. As α approaches 1, the full
credibility case, the slope curve flattens and becomes S-shaped.
A considerable body of the empirical literature found that the eﬀects of the
nonlinearities from the honey moon/smooth pasting condition are negligible.
See, for example, Meese and Rose [29] for three alternative regimes, the ±1
percent band of the Bretton Woods system, the gold standard for the British
11
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Pound, the French Franc and the Deustche Mark (versus the US Dollar), and
third, the EMS regime for the Dutch Guilder and the French Franc cases (versus
the Deustche Mark). The null hypothesis of nonlinearities is rejected for the
three regimes. Lewis [26] runs a variety of tests for the G-3 case (US, Germany
and Japan) in order to check for possible non linearities arising from implicit
target bands and from the intervention policy. In all the cases, the exchange
rate seemed to be a linear function of the estimated fundamentals. Evidence
on the rejection of the nonlinear hypothesis is also reported in Lindberg and
Söderlind [27] for Swedish data. Flood, Rose and Mathieson [15] do not find
relevant evidence of the smooth pasting for three alternative testing methods.
Iannizzotto and Taylor [22] for the Belgian Franc, Danish Krona, and the French
Franc against the Deustche Mark and Taylor and Iannizzotto [40] for the French
Franc against the Deustche Mark find nonlinearities to be negligible using the
method of simulated moments to estimate Krugman’s model. Opposite to these
results, and also using a maximum Likelihood Method of Simulated Moments
estimator applied to Krugman’s model, De Jong [11] found that the exchange
rates of the Belgian Franc, Danish Krona, and the French Franc against the
Deustche Mark presented significant nonlinearities.
Evidence of nonlinearities appears once intramarginal interventions are al-
lowed. This is the case of Bessec [8] and Crespo et al. [10]. These authors
assume the exchange rate fluctuates freely within a band of inaction. However,
when the exchange rate moves outside this interval, the authorities intervene
to drive back the exchange rate to the central parity. The estimation from a
SETAR model confirms this type of behavior for the Belgian Franc, the French
Franc, the Irish Punt and the Dutch Guilder.
Another group of papers are able to corroborate nonlinear specifications for
the exchange rate introducing problems of credibility in the target zone. In this
sense, Vilasuso and Cunningham [41] test for nonlinearities using the bispec-
trum. They find that the Belgian Franc, the Danish Krona, the Dutch Guilder
and the French Franc follow a linear process over the period 1979—1987, when
several realignments took place. But from 1987—1992, these currencies follow
a nonlinear process, as with the credible target zone model where an inherent
nonlinearity stabilizes exchange rates. Also, Bekaert and Gray [5] specify the
distribution of exchange rate changes conditioned on a latent jump variable
where the probability and size of a jump is a function of financial and macro-
economic variables. With this modeling strategy they find significative evidence
of the presence of nonlinearities in the French Franc/Deutsche Mark rate dur-
ing the EMS. Finally, the relation between credibility and linearity is explicitly
tested in Forbes and Kofman [16]. As in our theoretical model, these authors
find that a reduction in the credibility of the target zone implies a linearization
of the S-shape. Once they take this relation into account, strong evidence of a
nonlinear structure for the French Franc-Deustche Mark exchange rate appears
in the data.
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3.3 U-shaped versus hump-shaped distributions
In the standard model, the U-shaped distribution is implied by the perfect
credibility assumption. Since the exchange rate function flattens near the edges,
a considerable mass of probability will be concentrated at the margins. However,
the empirical literature has pointed out that the distribution of the exchange
rate is hump-shaped rather than U -shaped.5
Figures 4, 5 and 6 plot the ergodic probabilities of diﬀerent depreciation
rates within the band for λ = 2 and for three diﬀerent values of α: 0, 0.8
and 1. As suggested before, figure 4 shows that for the particular case of α =
1, the exchange rate distribution displays a U-shaped distribution. On the
contrary, figures 5 and 6 show that for α diﬀerent than 1, the distribution is
hump-shaped. This occurs even for values of α close to 1. The explanation
is twofold. The first reason is related to the value of α. For low values of α,
continuous realignments move the exchange rate to new central parities, that is,
to new centers of new bands. Additionally, lack of credibility implies that the
slope of exchange rate function increases at margins, as we have shown in the
previous subsection. Thus, stability is higher around the centers. This helps to
accumulate probability mass at the interior of the bands. This second reason
has to do with the value of λ. If this parameter is high, the central bank will
have incentives to further stabilize the exchange rate.
3.4 The relation between exchange rates and interest rate
diﬀerentials
Empirical observations have shown the existence of a positive relationship be-
tween the exchange rate and the interest rate diﬀerential.6 Bertola and Svensson
[7] suggest that incorporating a realignment risk premium may alter the sign of
the covariance between these two variables from negative to positive.
In our model, this relation has always a positive sign, regardless the value of
the parameters. This is a consequence of intramarginal interventions, summa-
rized by the first order condition (16). Both the interest rate and the exchange
rate are driven by the same variable, namely, the risk premium. The central
bank decides at each period how to distribute the shock on rt between xt and
dt. Expression (16) tells us that it is always optimal to move both variables on
the same direction with λ being the ratio between the two. This gives rise to a
positive linear relationship between the two variables. Hence, the honeymoon
eﬀect is also transmitted to the interest rate smoothing.
5See, for example, Bertola and Caballero [6] for the French Franc against the Deustche
Mark exchange rate case during 1979-87; and Lindberg and Söderlind [27], [28], for the Swedish
unilateral target zone with a vast set of daily data covering from 1982 to 90. The work of
Flood, Rose and Mathieson [15] also finds hump-shaped histograms for EMS exchange rates.
They use daily data for eight EMS currencies and the British Pound (during its pre EMS
membership) over 1979-90, weekly data from the classical gold standard (UK, US, France and
Germany), and monthly data from the Bretton Woods regime.
6 See Svensson [35], Flood, Rose and Mathieson [15], Lindberg and Söderlind [27], and
Bertola and Caballero [6].
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3.5 On the choice of the degree of exchange rate flexibility
In this subsection, we estimate the loss functions for diﬀerent degrees of exchange
rate flexibility using the set of parameters stated before. Losses for the fixed
rate, the infinite band and the free float are given by expressions (9), (17) and
(11). The target zone loss is numerically computed. We consider a starting
point r0 = 0, and a time horizon of 2000 periods. This time length accumulates
91.2% of the total accruing value and does not alter the ordinality of values for
the exchange regimes. Calculations of the indirect costs are reported in table 3
for w = ±2.25% and table 4 for w = ±6%. In each table, the first row refers to
the cost of the fixed rate regime, Jc, and the following five rows represent the
costs of a target zone for α = 0, 14 ,
1
2 ,
3
4 , and 1, respectively. The seventh and
eighth rows collect the infinite band costs, J∞, and the free float costs, Jff .
From these tables we highlight the following results.
First, as it was mentioned above, the fixed rate is the regime with the lowest
value for the loss function.
Second, with respect to the target zone regime, the closer α is to 1, the
smaller the losses are. This represents the gain from credibility of commitment
to a zone. The slopes of both the exchange rate function and the interest rate
diﬀerential flatten for α approaching to 1. When market traders perceive that
the CB will defend the fluctuation band with a high probability, the realignment
risk will be low and the exchange rate responses to changes in the foreign risk
premium will be soft. In turn, this perception will contribute to smooth the
expected rate of depreciation. Hence, the outcome is that the interest rate
diﬀerential will be more stable as well.
Third, for target zones very close to being credible (α close to 1), the present
value of the costs of a target zone are smaller than the costs of intramarginal
interventions with an infinite band. Notice that, unlike the previous literature
that used the free floating as an alternative, the right regime to be compared
with is the infinite band with interventions. As with the second result, forward
looking agents help stabilize the rate without pressuring the interest rate, due
to the honey moon eﬀect.
To make this point clearer, figures 7, 8 and 9 represent the contributions to
the loss functions due to the variability of the exchange rate and the interest rate
for all the regimes and values of λ equal to 0.5, 1, and 2, respectively. The circle
corresponds to the fixed rate, the square to the infinite band and the triangles
are the target zones for diﬀerent values of α. It is clear that there must be an
interval for α close to 1 that reduces the volatility of both the exchange rate
and the interest rate with respect to the managed float.
4 Conclusions
This paper presents a target zone model based on two extensions of Krugman’s
[23] model. These extensions are the introduction of intramarginal interventions
and the lack of credibility of the target zone. These two features had been
14
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.upo.es/econ 
analyzed separately by the literature. Here, we show that both extensions are
suﬃcient to reconcile the model with the data. The leaning against the wind
policy derived from the time-consistent intramarginal intervention produces a
positive relation between exchange rates and interest rates diﬀerentials as we
observe in the data as well as is behind the almost linear relation between
exchange rates and fundamentals. Furthermore, lack of credibility contributes
to the hump-shape distribution of exchange rates.
As a second application, the model provides a framework in which to evalu-
ate why imposing bands of fluctuation seem to be the dominant exchange rate
regime in contemporary history. We show that even not perfectly credible bands
of fluctuation may improve with respect to infinite bands in terms of reducing
simultaneously the volatility of both exchange rates and interest rates diﬀeren-
tials. In this way, we operationalize the common view that fluctuation bands
are preferred because they reap the benefits of both flexible and fixed exchange
rates, by stabilizing the exchange rate without loosing monetary independence.
These two benefits are explicitly included in the model and are a result of the
interaction between the preferences of the central bank and the credibility of its
monetary policy.
One important assumption in the model is that the width of the band is
known by market participants. This assumption is crucial for including in the
analysis regimes where the central bank does not publicly announce a target
zone but it is in fact restricting the fluctuation of the exchange rate around
a particular level. It has been argued that the uncertainty about the exact
location of this target zone may be more important for the behavior of the
exchange rate than the credibility of the band. In [33] we tackle this issue.
Using a model along the lines of the one presented in this paper, we endogenize
the width of the band. To capture the notion of implicit bands, we solve the
model for a subgame perfect equilibrium where the central bank is given a menu
of alternative band widths. Given the deep parameters of the model (i.e., those
of the central bank preferences, λ and β, and the exogenous process, σ) any
of these bands induces an endogenous probability of realignment. Backward
induction then reveals market traders the minimum cost regime, which in turn
signals the optimal band to be credibly committed by the central bank. Thus,
once we allow for the band width to be endogenous, market participants should
be able to infer it from information on the central bank preferences and the
exogenous shock.
On the other hand, the empirical literature has pointed out that the cred-
ibility of a target zone erodes as time goes by. In the present paper, however,
we have assumed that the parameters of the model are all constant across time.
This means that preferences and the credibility perceived by market traders re-
main constant forever. To the extent that the credibility of exchange rate bands
decreases over time, any recommendation regarding the virtues of limiting the
fluctuations of the exchange rate should be moderated. By endogenizing the
probability of the band, [33] can also help to understand why the credibility of
target zones has been decreasing over time.
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A A General Equilibrium Model
The central bank preferences in the paper, included in expression (2.7), can
be interpreted in two ways. First, it could represent the fear of floating of a
central bank, that is, the fear that the exchange rate would deviate from its
long run equilibrium or have excess volatility. In this situation, central banks
try to smooth exchange rates by means of interest rate policy or interventions.
This is captured by losses that combine volatility of interest rate together with
volatility of the exchange rate with respect to its long-run equilibrium value.
The second interpretation deals with the first order condition in (2.14). This
expression can be interpreted as a monetary conditions index which implies that
the variation of the risk premium should be split optimally between changes in
the exchange rate and the interest rate. To motivate such a form for a monetary
conditions index, consider the following model in the spirit of Detken and Gaspar
[12], Walsh [42] or West [43]:
πt = ηzt + βEt(πt+1) + ut, (22)
zt = −ϑ[it −Et(πt+1)] +Et(zt+1) + ψ(xt − pt) + gt, (23)
it = Et(xt+1)− xt + rt, (24)
where πt is the inflation rate, zt is the deviation of output from its natural rate,
it is the nominal interest rate, xt is the nominal exchange rate, and pt is the
price level. The variables ut, gt are disturbances. Equation (22) is a Phillips
curve while (23) is an open economy version of an IS curve. Expression (24)
represents deviations from the uncovered interest rate parity due to the risk
premium rt.7 The central bank is assumed to modify the interest rate it to
minimize the standard objective function
L = Et
" ∞X
τ=0
βτ
¡
π2t+τ + ξz
2
t+τ
¢#
.
which represent a second order Taylor expansion of the expected utility of the
representative consumer as derived in Woodford [44] or Rotemberg and Wood-
ford [34] for a closed economy.
The disturbances ut and gt are assumed iid and not known at the time of the
policy decision.8 They serve the purpose of preventing the central bank from
knowing the current (and possibly the near past) values of output and inflation.
The risk premium is assumed to follow a AR(1) process with coeﬃcient equal
to h. The only information the monetary authority has at the time of its policy
decision is the interest rate, the exchange rate and, by (24), the risk premium.
The first order condition reads
zt = −
η
ξ
πt.
7Here the foreign interest rate is assumed equal to zero for simplicity.
8The results below hold under more general processes for ut and gt.
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Using this expression, in (22) and (23) allows us to write
ϑit − ψxt =
·
η
ξ
− ψ
¸
Φut + gt − ψpt−1, (25)
with
Φ =
ξ
ξ + η2
.
In terms of xt and it, the solution is
xt =
·
1− η
ξ (ϑ+ ψ)
¸
Φut −
1
ϑ+ ψ
gt +
ϑ
ϑ(1− h) + ψrt + pt−1 (26)
and
it =
·
η
ξ (ϑ+ ψ)
¸
Φut +
1
ϑ+ ψ
gt +
ψ
ϑ(1− h) + ψrt. (27)
The left hand-side of (25) can interpreted as a nominal monetary conditions
index (MCI). This expression implies that this MCI should not be aﬀected by
the risk premium. Thus, as (26) and (27) indicate, in order to manage the
changes in the output gap and inflation optimally, the variation in the risk
premium rt should be split between the interest rate it and the exchange rate
xt so as to leave the MCI constant. Notice the degree to which the risk premium
aﬀects the interest rate and the exchange rate (governed by the parameter λ in
the preferences (2.7)) depends on the parameter ψ which measures the openness
of the economy, the parameter ϑ, which measures the response of output to the
interest rate, and the persistence of the risk premium shock as measured by
the parameter µ. In general, as the value of ψ (ϑ) increases (decreases), the
central bank should channel a larger proportion of the risk premium shock to
interest rates and a smaller fraction to the exchange rate. Also notice that
for µ = 1, that is, when the risk premium follows a random walk, as we have
assumed in the paper, the interest rate should move one to one with the risk
premium. Furthermore, the risk premium impact on the exchange rate is in that
case ϑ/ψ, which could be interpreted as the relative importance of the internal
transmission channel (i.e. that of the interest rate) to the external transmission
channel (i.e. that of the exchange rate).
B Solution of the model
In this appendix we do not assume that the realignment rate must be higher
than the width. Consider a center ρt = 0 and parity ct = 0. Then, the function
x (rt) must be rewritten as
x (rt) = ct



+max {w, µ} if rt > r with probability 1− α
+w if rt > r with probability α
+u (rt+1) if rt ∈ [−r, r]
−w if rt < −r with probability α
−max {w, µ} if rt < −r with probability 1− α.
(28)
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We show how to make the computations for the solution of the target zone
regime. Forward recursion in the first order condition (21) is used to solve for
u (rt) subject to (28). Let the expected rate of depreciation out of the band be
given by
δτ,τ−1 = [αw + (1− α)max {w, µ}] (29)
× [Pr (rt+τ > r|rt+τ−1)− Pr (rt+τ < −r|rt+τ−1)]
Forward iteration of (21) leads to the following general solution
u (rt) =
rt
1 + λ
+
1
1 + λ
∞X
τ=1
F [rt+τ |Fτ ]
(1 + λ)−τ
+
∞X
τ=1
F [δτ,τ−1 |Fτ−1 ]
(1 + λ)−τ
, (30)
where the sequence Fτ≥0 represents filtered information sets of the next form:
F0 = {rt} , (31)
Fτ≥1 = {{rt+n ∈ [−r, r]}τn=1 , rt} . (32)
On the other hand, the components in (30) are given by:
F [δ1,0 |F0 ] = [αw + (1− α)max {w,µ}] (33)
× [Pr (rt+1 > r|rt)− Pr (rt+1 < −r|rt)]
F [rt+1 |F1 ] =
Z r
−r
rt+1φ (rt+1|rt) drt+1, (34)
for τ = 1, and
F [δτ,τ−1 |Fτ−1 ] =
Z r
−r
...
Z r
−r
δτ,τ−1φ (rt+τ−1, ..., rt+1|rt) drt+τ−1...drt+1, (35)
F [rt+τ |Fτ ] =
Z r
−r
...
Z r
−r
rt+τφ (rt+τ , ..., rt+1|rt) drt+τ ...drt+1, (36)
for τ = 2, 3, ..., where
φ (rt+τ , ..., rt+1|rt) =
¡
2πσ2
¢−τ/2
exp
"
−1
2σ2
τX
n=1
(rt+n − rt+n−1)2
#
. (37)
This general solution is consistent with (21) and (28). In order to determine a
particular solution, it is necessary to identify the value of r for which u (r) = w.
B.1 A numerical approximation
The general solution (30) involves a collection of integrals where only (33) and
(34) enjoy an explicit form. Numerical solutions are requested for the remaining
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ones. Here, we propose a method that discretizes variable rt onK values (K ≥ 3
odd) within the interval [−r, r] as
r = r1, r2, ..., rK , (38)
r1 = −r,
rk = rk−1 + h, (39)
h = 2r/ (K − 1) > 0, (40)
rK = r,
rK+1
2
= 0,
In practice, we have used K = 101.
Let P, Q, R, S and T be row vectors (1×K), adopting the following form
P1 = Φ
µ
−r + h/2− rt
σ
¶
− Φ
µ
−r − rt
σ
¶
(41)
Pk = Φ
µ
rk + h/2− rt
σ
¶
− Φ
µ
rk − h/2− rt
σ
¶
PK = Φ
µ
r − rt
σ
¶
− Φ
µ
r − h/2− rt
σ
¶
with rt given and
Qk = 1− Φ
µ
r − rk
σ
¶
− Φ
µ
−r − rk
σ
¶
, (42)
Rk =
·
Φ
µ
r − rk
σ
¶
− Φ
µ
−r − rk
σ
¶¸
rk + (43)
σ
·
φ
µ
−r − rk
σ
¶
− φ
µ
r − rk
σ
¶¸
,
for k = 1, 2, ...,K, and
T = [αw + (1− α)max {w, µ}]Q (44)
where φ and Φ represent, respectively, the Gaussian pdf and cdf.
For the first period ahead, and only for this period, integrals (33) and (34)
have explicit form:
E [δ1,0 |F0 ] = [αw + (1− α)max {w,µ}]
·
1− Φ
µ
r − rt
σ
¶
− Φ
µ
−r − rt
σ
¶¸
E [rt+1 |F1 ] =
·
Φ
µ
r − rt
σ
¶
− Φ
µ
−r − rt
σ
¶¸
rt
+σ
·
φ
µ
−r − rt
σ
¶
− φ
µ
r − rt
σ
¶¸
.
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For the second period ahead, a numerical approximation is given by
E [δ2,1 |F1 ] = TP 0,
E [rt+2 |F2 ] = RP 0.
This implies that the value of the integrals at t+2 is determined for any possible
mean at t+1, rt+1 ∈ [−r, r], and any of these means is weighted by a probability
P , given a starting value rt at t.
The loop becomes harder as the period ahead increases over three. In order
to solve this problem, we develope a backward recursion algorithm, for which
the last period integral is firstly solved and then proceed backward up to the
first one. Thereby, consider the following non negative matrix M ∈ RK×K
M1,l = Φ
µ
−r + h/2− rl
σ
¶
− Φ
µ
−r − rl
σ
¶
,
Mk,l = Φ
µ
rk + h/2− rl
σ
¶
− Φ
µ
rk − h/2− rl
σ
¶
,
MK,l = Φ
µ
r − rl
σ
¶
− Φ
µ
r − h/2− rl
σ
¶
,
for k, l = 1, 2, ...K, with the following properties: the sum over each column
gives a row vector mc ∈ R1×K , with all its components lying within the (0, 1)
interval
mc (l) =
KX
k=1
Mkl =
Z r
−r
φ (s|rl) ds ∈ (0, 1) (45)
for l = 1, 2, ...,K. The proof follows trivially. This property is suﬃcient to
verify the Hawkins-Simon condition (Brauer-Solow Theorem).
Matrix M contains the transition probabilities in the intermediate periods
from τ up to τ + 1, within the interval [−r, r] and for any conditional mean
belonging to [−r, r]. Thus, the solution for the third period is given by
E [δ3,2 |F2 ] = TMP 0,
E [rt+3 |F3 ] = RMP 0.
Again, the value of the integrals are first determined at t + 3 for any possible
mean at t+ 2, rt+2 ∈ [−r, r], given by the columns of M . The vector P closes
the calculation for any possible mean at t+1, rt+1 ∈ [−r, r], for given a starting
value rt.
For τ = 2, 3, ..., further generalization gives a sequence:
E [δτ,τ−1 |Fτ−1 ] = TMτ−2P 0,
E [rt+τ |Fτ ] = RMτ−2P 0.
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Plugging these values into (30), one obtains
u (rt) =
rt
1 + λ
+
E [rt+1 |F1 ]
(1 + λ)2
+
E [δ1,0 |F0 ]
1 + λ
(46)
+
1
1 + λ
∞X
τ=2
RMτ−2P 0
(1 + λ)τ
+
∞X
τ=2
TMτ−2P 0
(1 + λ)τ
.
Let the vector of eigenvalues be given by η (M), and call η∗ (M) the Frobe-
nius root, i.e. the maximum eigenvalue. From (45) we know thatmc (l) < 1, this
is a suﬃcient condition to verify the Hawkins-Simon condition (see Brauer-Solow
Theorem). In turn, verification of the Hawkins-Simon condition implies that
η∗ (M) < 1, (see Hawkins and Simon [20] and [21]). Then, matrix (I −M)−1
exists, it is non negative and can be written as
(I −M)−1 =
∞X
j=0
M j
This gives rise to a convenient simplification
M =
∞X
τ=2
(1 + λ)−τ Mτ−2 =
1
1 + λ
[(1 + λ) I −M ]−1 .
The general solution becomes
u (rt) =
Ω (rt)
1 + λ
+∆ (rt) , (47)
with
Ω (rt) ≡ rt +
E [rt+1 |F1 ]
1 + λ
+RMP 0,
∆ (rt) ≡
E [δ1,0 |F0 ]
1 + λ
+ TMP 0.
Application of level conditions (18) and (19) gives the particular solution
Ω (r)
1 + λ
+∆ (r) = w.
Finally, the exchange rate expectation is
Etxt+1 =
∞X
τ=1
F [rt+τ |Fτ ]
(1 + λ)τ
+ (1 + λ)
∞X
τ=1
F [δτ,τ−1 |Fτ−1 ]
(1 + λ)τ
,
or using the previous approximation
Etxt+1 = Ω (rt) + (1 + λ)∆ (rt)− rt. (48)
Once we know the expression for the exchange rate and the expectation, the
interest rates diﬀerential is obtained from the uncovered interest parity condition
as
dt = Ω (rt) + (1 + λ)∆ (rt)− xt (49)
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C Tables and figures
Table 1
Estimated standard deviation (σ)
British Pound 0.0005
French Franc 0.0011
Deustche Mark 0.0025
Japanese Yen 0.0012
Swiss Franc 0.0000
Table 2
Realignment rates in the ERM
± 2.25 bands ± 6.00 bands
Date FF IRP BF DK ITL Date SP PE
24-Sep-1979 2.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 2.00 17-Sep-1992 5.26
30-Nov-1979 0.14 5.00 23-Nov-1992 6.38 6.38
23-Mar-1981 -0.14 6.38 14-May-1993 8.70 6.95
5-Oct-1981 8.76 5.50 5.50 5.50 8.76
22-Feb-1982 9.29 3.09
14-Jun-1982 10.61 4.25 4.25 4.25 7.20
21-Mar-1983 8.20 9.33 3.94 2.93 8.20
25-Jul-1985 8.51
6-Apr-1986 6.19 3.00 1.98 1.98 3.00
2-Aug-1986 8.70
12-Jan-1987 3.00 3.00 0.98 3.00 3.00
8-Jan-1990 3.82
14-Sep-1992 7.25
Average 6.49 5.86 3.10 3.84 5.54 Average 6.78 6.67
Std. dev. 3.39 3.41 3.01 1.26 2.42 Std. dev. 1.75 0.40
Note: FF stands for French Franc, IRP for Irish Punt, BF for Belgium Franc, DK for Danish
Krona, ITL for Italian Lira, SP for Spanish Peseta and PE for Portuguese escudo.
Table 3
Loss function for w = 0.0225
λ 0.2 0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
Jc 0.4444 0.4444 0.4444 0.4444 0.4444
J tz (α = 0) 15.4674 15.1098 4.3379 1.6561 0.6280
J tz
¡
α = 14
¢
10.0236 8.3402 3.2813 1.4845 0.6123
J tz
¡
α = 12
¢
5.7592 4.9529 2.5509 1.3253 0.5999
J tz
¡
α = 34
¢
3.0643 3.0624 2.0009 1.1846 0.5864
J tz (α = 1) 0.4655 0.4919 0.5207 0.5430 0.5244
Jmf 2.6665 1.3333 0.8888 0.6666 0.5333
Jff 0.5333 0.6666 0.8888 1.3333 2.6665
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Table 4
Loss function for w = 0.06
λ 0.2 0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
Jc 0.4444 0.4444 0.4444 0.4444 0.4444
J tz (α = 0) 2.0927 1.3081 0.9428 0.6559 0.5333
J tz
¡
α = 14
¢
1.9960 1.2758 0.9403 0.6559 0.5333
J tz
¡
α = 12
¢
1.8762 1.2399 0.9301 0.6547 0.5333
J tz
¡
α = 34
¢
1.6704 1.1951 0.9102 0.6544 0.5333
J tz (α = 1) 0.5761 0.6778 0.7106 0.6487 0.5333
Jmf 2.6665 1.3333 0.8888 0.6666 0.5333
Jff 0.5333 0.6666 0.8888 1.3333 2.6665
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Note: This figure shows the function linking the exchange rate to the fundamental for different regimes. (1) is 
the free float, (2) is the managed float, (3) is the target zone with α = 0, (4) is the target zone with α = 0.5, 
and (5) is the target zone with α = 1. 
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FIGURE 2
Function u(r) for λ = 1
Note: See note to Figure 1. 
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FIGURE 4
Stationary probability distribution for λ = 0.5 and α = 0
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Stationary probability distribution for λ = 0.5 and α = 1
FIGURE 5
Stationary probability distribution for λ = 0.5 and α = 0.8
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FIGURE 8
Contributions to the costs for λ = 1
FIGURE 7
Contributions to the costs for λ = 0.2
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Note: This figure shows the volatility of interest rate differentials (d) versus the volatility of the exchange rate (x) 
for different regimes. The circle is the free float, the square is the managed float. Among the triangles (1) is the 
target zone with α = 0, (2) is the target zone with α = 0.25, (3) is the target zone with α = 0.5 , (4) is the target 
zone with α = 0.5 , and (5) is the target zone with α = 1. 
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FIGURE 9
Contributions to the costs for λ = 2
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